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DOUBLE-TROUBLE: THE UNDERREGULATION OF
SURREPTITIOUS VIDEO SURVEILLANCE IN
CONJUNCTION WITH THE USE OF SNITCHES IN
DOMESTIC GOVERNMENT INVESTIGATIONS
Mona R. Shokrai*
[1] Technological advancements in digital imagery and visual recordings
have all but vitiated any expectation of privacy in public places. Yet this
Orwellian state of constant governmental surveillance has extended beyond
the scope of public observation. Closely-held expectations of privacy in
the most intimate locations have also become subject to government
observation. The means by which the government is able to garner such
detailed information concerning the minutiae of our private lives is in need
of assessment.
[2] Covert video surveillance is one of the most intrusive mechanisms by
which law enforcement officials can gather incriminating evidence. The
invasiveness of this investigative technique requires that some kind of
procedural safeguards be applied in order to protect our fundamental
interests against government searches and seizures under the Fourth
Amendment.1 However, there are currently no guidelines in place to
regulate domestic investigations utilizing any form of video surveillance.
Protective doctrines such as the warrant requirement and its procedural
*J.D., Loyola Law School, Los Angeles, 2006. Mona.Shokrai@gmail.com. The issues
raised in this Article stemmed from my legal work with Richard G. Novak, Esq., to whom
I am indelibly grateful for providing me with the knowledge and excitement to write about
this gap in the law. Many thanks to Gina Genova, Mariana Mello, Natalie Artin, Professor
Susan Bakhshian, and Professor Gary Marx for their thoughts and assistance. Special
thanks to Professor Alexandra Natapoff for her guidance and feedback throughout the
process—and for being impressed with my “willingness to try hard things.” A very
special thank you to Amir Aharonov who contributed countless hours of his insight, hard
critique, and brilliance.
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U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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hurdles protect our rights against government intrusion in private locations.
When these procedural safeguards are circumvented, our constitutional
rights become placed in jeopardy of governmental violation.
[3] Despite the lack of specific regulation for video surveillance, many
courts have applied provisions of related doctrines, such as the law
governing wiretapping and electronic surveillance,2 to this type of
investigation. When surreptitious video surveillance is carried out in
conjunction with the use of consenting informants, a regulatory loophole is
created that can result in unjustified governmental intrusions upon the
rights of the surveillee. The confluence of these two areas of jurisprudence
creates a path by which law enforcement officials are able to effectively
bypass the warrant requirement or any other applicable procedural hurdle.
Without creating specifically tailored legislation or precedent to govern
investigations utilizing snitches to surreptitiously videotape the subjects of
an investigation, the police need only find an accomplice to circumvent all
constitutional protections.3
[4] This paper discusses this problem in current regulation and the
implications of this regulatory inconsistency. Part I discusses the law
governing domestic video surveillance under its current judicial
permutations. It also illustrates the inconsistency in application by looking
at a jurisdictional survey of case law on the topic. Part II discusses the
current law governing the use of snitches in undercover investigations, the
effects of which have created the regulatory loophole at issue. Part III then
discusses the institutional, social, and regulatory ramifications of allowing
such regulatory inconsistencies to persist.
I. CURRENT LAW GOVERNING VIDEO SURVEILLANCE
[5] The pervasiveness of video cameras and other visual recording devices
in daily life supports the need for regulations and parameters in place to
govern their uses.4 The amount of detail that can be garnered from video
2

See e.g. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2518 (2001).
See Melanie L. Black Dubis, The Consensual Electronic Surveillance Experiment: State
Courts React to United States v. White, 47 VAND L. REV. 857 (1994).
4
See Christopher Slobogin, Technologically-Assisted Physical Surveillance: The
American Bar Association’s Tentative Draft Standards, 10 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 383, 405
(1997). The author states that the ABA’s definition of video surveillance excludes “the
3

2

Richmond Journal of Law & Technology

Volume XIII, Issue1

surveillance recordings underscores the necessity for applicable
guidelines.5 There is no single rule in application that regulates various
forms of video surveillance and recording in both the public and private
spheres. While public locations are considered “fair game”6 as the subject
of virtually any method of surveillance under the doctrine of public
exposure,7the most significant deficiencies in regulation arise from covert,
hidden, or surreptitious video surveillance8 of private locations.9
A. SURREPTITIOUS VIDEO SURVEILLANCE PROMPTS A HIKE IN THE LEVEL
OF INTRUSION UPON THE PRIVACY INTEREST OF THE SURVEILLEE
[6] Advancements in surveillance technology have supplied law
enforcement with numerous new investigative tools, tactics, and methods.
These advancements have been the source of tremendous simplification
and ease, providing investigators with time and effort saving advantages to
more traditional painstaking investigative tactics.10 Nonetheless, these
advances have simultaneously created the prospect of colossal invasions
into individual privacy.11 Video camera surveillance is distinguishable
use of a ‘lawfully positioned’ camera to view or record activities ‘occurring within the
sight or immediate vicinity of a law enforcement official (or agent thereof) who is aware
of such use.’” Id. at 414.
5
Id. at 385-408.
6
This refers to the lack of any expectation of privacy an individual is held to retain, and
the consequential authority vested in the surveillors to implement such surveillance
without having to stay within any defined boundaries.
7
The Fourth Amendment does not protect what one knowingly exposes to the public.
Information, actions, and conduct that are “knowingly exposed to the public” are
considered to be in plain view. Consequently, capturing or viewing this content by any
method of surveillance, is not defined as a “search” under the ambit of Fourth Amendment
protection. In contrast, Constitutional protection extends to that which one keeps private
(even within a public location). See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
8
See Slobogin, supra note 4, at 414. Professor Christopher Slobogin clarifies the
determination for covert surveillance by including whether the law enforcement surveyor
“intends that the subject of the surveillance be unaware of the monitoring and if a
reasonable person in the subject’s position would be unaware of it.” Id. at 414-15.
9
The focus of this paper is on covert video surveillance that is conducted in private
locations. Public or overt video surveillance, which carry independent concerns under the
realm of Fourth Amendment analysis, are not within the scope of this paper.
10
See Ric Simmons, Symposium: The Powers and Pitfalls of Technology: TechnologyEnhanced Surveillance By Law Enforcement Officials, 60 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 711
(2005).
11
Id. at 711.
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from traditional physical searches.12 Because of this prospect, our society
should focus less on investigative efficiency, and more on the need to
reinforce and safeguard our Fourth Amendment rights with more vigor.
[7] In Lopez v. United States, the United States Supreme Court established
that the use of technology adds no greater intrusion to a search.13
However, the nuances of video surveillance distinguish it from the oral or
wire communications the Court discusses in Lopez. Physical searches, or
even aural surveillance and recordation, do not reach the level of
invasiveness that is the product of visual surveillance and recordation. The
minutiae or peripheral imagery captured, oftentimes containing visual cues
beyond the line of sight of any cooperating informant or party to the
conversation, can be reviewed, enlarged, or even enhanced to provide the
investigating agents with evidence they would not have been able to
acquire by any other means.14 No debriefing or testimony provided by an
informant or party to the conversation would be able to match the fine
details or imagery depicted and acquired by a video recording.15
[8] Federal appellate courts visiting this issue have also characterized
surreptitious video surveillance as “one of the most intrusive investigative
12

See GARY T. MARX, UNDERCOVER: POLICE SURVEILLANCE IN AMERICA 217-19 (1988).
In his book on covert police action, Professor Marx notes ten characteristics of new
investigative technologies “that set them apart from most traditional forms of social
control”:
(1)
The new surveillance transcends distance, darkness, and physical
barriers;
(2)
It transcends time; its records can be stored, retrieved, combined,
analyzed, and communicated;
(3)
It has low visibility or is invisible;
(4)
It is often involuntary;
(5)
Prevention is a major concern;
(6)
It is capital- rather than labor-intensive;
(7)
It involves decentralized self-policing;
(8)
It triggers a shift from targeting a specific suspect to category suspicion
of everyone (or at least everyone within a particular category);
(9)
It is more intensive; and
(10)
It is more extensive.
13
Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427 (1963).
14
See Christopher S. Milligan, Note, Facial Recognition Technology, Video Surveillance,
and Privacy, 9 S. CAL. INTERDIS. L.J. 295, 309-11 (1999).
15
United States v. Davis, 326 F.3d 361, 367 (S.D.N.Y 2003); Lopez, 373 U.S. at 439.
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mechanisms available to law enforcement.”16 In particular, the Ninth
Circuit has acknowledged and integrated this description of hidden video
surveillance in its interpretations and in its rulings on several cases
involving covert visual recording and surveillance during criminal
investigations. Because of its invasiveness, video surveillance has been
found to reach “beyond the perimeter of a person’s reasonable expectations
of privacy”—far beyond the scope of other electronic monitoring devices.17
The Ninth Circuit further noted, “[t]he silent, unblinking lens of the camera
was intrusive in a way that no temporary search of [a home or] office could
have been.”18
[9] In United States v. Nerber, the Ninth Circuit noted, “[t]he sweeping,
indiscriminate manner in which video surveillance can intrude upon us,
regardless of where we are, dictates that its use be approved only in limited
circumstances.”19 Further, Judge Kozinski of the Ninth Circuit, visiting the
issue of regulating video surveillance in his concurrence in United States v.
Koyomejian, articulated:
As every court considering the issue has noted, video
surveillance can result in extraordinarily serious intrusions
into personal privacy. Is it reasonable to place a camera in
the home where it is likely to monitor people while they go
to the bathroom, while they engage in intimate relations,
while they cook and clean, while they sweep dirt under the
rug? If such intrusions are ever permissible, they must be
justified by an extraordinary showing of need.20
[10] Since courts consider video surveillance an immense intrusion into
personal privacy, our society must be concerned with the current state of
regulatory limbo. Despite the need for a universally applicable set of
guidelines controlling the use of video surveillance, there is more room for
irregularity because jurisdictionally-specific approaches currently govern
this process.
16

United States v. Nerber, 222 F.3d 597, 603 (9th Cir. 2000).
United States v. Andonian, 735 F.Supp. 1469,1478 (9th Cir. 1990).
18
United States v. Taketa, 923 F.2d 665, 677 (9th Cir. 1991).
19
Nerber, 222 F.3d at 603.
20
United States v. Koyomejian, 970 F.2d 536, 551 (9th Cir. 1992) (Kozinski, J.,
concurring).
17
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B. DISTINCT JURISPRUDENTIAL APPROACHES TO COVERT VIDEO
SURVEILLANCE
[11] Circuit courts facing the issue of covert, surreptitious video
surveillance from within private locations have applied various approaches
– some courts drawing on existing criminal jurisprudence for analysis,
while other courts have failed to articulate any approach. Commonality
between some circuits can only be found in application of two main
branches of criminal jurisprudence to this inquiry: (1) Analysis under the
Fourth Amendment,21 and (2) The application of Title III’s regulations
governing “electronic communications.”22 Of those circuits that have
ventured to create an analytical framework, some circuits have drawn on
the former exclusively, others exclusively on the latter, while even other
circuits have taken this analysis beyond the bounds of these two
approaches by uniquely hybridizing these two doctrines into a more narrow
approach toward video surveillance. Regardless of which approach a court
decides to apply, however, the current state of regulation is still unclear.
1.

ANALYSIS OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION

[12] The foundational issue in any Fourth Amendment analysis is whether
a search or seizure has taken place.23 This determination depends on
whether the subject of the search, in this case the individual being
surveilled, had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the locale at issue.24
But what constitutes a reasonable expectation of privacy? Courts have
been grappling with this issue in various contexts for quite some time.
[13] Justice Harlan’s concurring opinion in Katz v. United States25
provided the benchmark standard from which to analyze whether the
subject of a search had a reasonable expectation of privacy. A legally
cognizable expectation of privacy must not only objectively be one that
society is prepared to recognize as reasonable, but the individual being

21

U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522 (2001).
23
Slobogin, supra note 4 at 389.
24
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
25
Id.
22
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searched must also have a subjective expectation of privacy in that
particular encounter.26
[14] The traditional inquiry often involves some sort of physical intrusion
that implicates this analysis.27 However, covert video surveillance often
fails to generate any form of physical contact. Nonetheless, the Fourth
Amendment’s guarantee against unreasonable searches does not retreat
simply because no physical intrusion has transpired.28
[15] The intrusion effected by the common physical search29 is terminated
at the conclusion of the encounter; the subject of this search will generally
be confident that all such contact has ceased. In contrast, the subject of
video surveillance can never be certain that an encounter is taking place,
and if so, at what point it has terminated,30 rendering video searches more
intrusive and of a nature that may be characterized as one that society is
prepared to recognize as objectively unreasonable. As long as the subject
of the video surveillance can demonstrate a subjective expectation of
privacy in the subject of the surveillance, the surveillee may maintain a
Katz claim that he or she did have a reasonable expectation of privacy,
notwithstanding the lack of any physical intrusion or contact during the
encounter.31

26

Id. at 361.
Id. at 352-53.
28
Id.
It is true that the absence of [physical] penetration was at one time thought to
foreclose further Fourth Amendment inquiry . . . for that amendment was thought
to limit only searches and seizures of tangible property. But the premise that
property interests control the right of the Government to search and seizure has
been discredited.
Id. (citing Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 304 (1967)).
29
Primitive searches refer to those generating physical contact between the law
enforcement agent and the subject of the search. Common examples include a pat-down
on the subject’s person, or the search of closed cabinets within a private dwelling.
30
See Marc Jonathan Blitz, Video Surveillance and the Constitution of Public Space:
Fitting the Fourth Amendment to a World that Tracks Image and Identity, 82 TEX. L. REV.
1349, 1355-56 (2004).
31
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967). Katz involved no physical intrusion,
yet the court recognized that the defendant did maintain a reasonable expectation of
privacy and as such, his Fourth Amendment rights were maintained.
27
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[16] When faced with the issue of admissibility of evidence acquired
through video surveillance, the Tenth Circuit in United States v. MesaRincon noted, “[t]he Fourth Amendment protects us against ‘unreasonable
searches and seizures.’ To determine whether a search is ‘reasonable,’ we
must balance the intrusiveness of the method used and the expectation of
privacy in the premises searched with the government’s showing of
necessity for the search.”32 In order to fairly scrutinize the regulation of
surreptitious video surveillance, these conflicting interests must be
evaluated. From a law enforcement perspective, video surveillance not
only enhances investigative capabilities, but also prompts a sharp decrease
in the strain on investigative resources. Despite such countervailing
benefits to state interests, use of covert video surveillance as an
investigative tool engenders a plethora of consequences, causing severe
detriment to the interests of the individual.33
[17] The impetus for constructing the warrant requirement, as found in the
language and composition of the Fourth Amendment, was to safeguard the
individual from any unjustifiable intrusion, either generated by the search
itself or as a byproduct of a proper search.34 Beyond the elemental
32

United States v. Mesa-Rincon, 911 F.2d 1433, 1442 (10th Cir. 1990). See also,
Christopher Slobogin, The World Without a Fourth Amendment, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1, 5
(1991). In his article, Professor Slobogin notes, “As American courts have recognized, the
regulation of search and seizure involves balancing the conflicting state and individual
interests implicated by the investigative process.” Id. at 5. As video surveillance and other
technologically advanced investigative tools streamline the process of gathering evidence,
we are left only with the Fourth Amendment to protect our privacy rights and
expectations. In characterizing the regulation of a search carried out through video
surveillance, we must first consider this balancing—between the usefulness of video
surveillance for the state’s investigations, and the intrusiveness of video surveillance upon
the individual’s privacy.
33
Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 222 (1981)
[I]n those situations in which a search warrant is necessary, the
inconvenience incurred by the police is generally insignificant.
Whatever practical problems [there are in requiring a search
warrant]…they cannot outweigh the constitutional interest at stake in
protecting the right of presumptively innocent people to be secure in
their homes from unjustified, forcible intrusions by the government.
34
U.S. Const. amend. IV
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath
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probable cause requirement,35 law enforcement agents must obtain a
warrant prior to initiating a search. The warrant requirement compels
investigators to seek ex ante authorization from a neutral and detached
judicial officer before properly initiating a search.36 Warrantless searches
are per se unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment. However, if the
encounter falls within one of the recognized exceptions to the warrant
requirement,37 most of which are based on principles of exigency, a
warrantless search may be permissible. If none of these exceptions apply
and a search is carried out without a warrant, the subject of the search has a
viable claim for the suppression of any evidence gathered or fruits derived
therefrom.38
[18] Additional constraints emerge from the particularity requirement,
effectively limiting the scope of an investigation. The Supreme Court in
Berger v. New York39 visited the need for such particularity, especially in
the context of eavesdropping:
The need for particularity and evidence of reliability in the
showing required when judicial authorization of a search is
sought is especially great in the case of eavesdropping. By
its very nature eavesdropping involves an intrusion on
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and
the persons or things to be seized.
35
Although there are various situations where probable cause is not required, the issues
that arise within the scope of this paper are not applied to such situations.
36
Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 212, 214 (1981) (“Absent exigent circumstances, a
magistrate, rather than a police officer, must make the decision that probable cause exists
to believe that person or object to be seized is within a particular place.”).
37
When there is an applicable exception to the warrant requirement, the law enforcement
officials do not need to obtain a warrant before initiating the search because the
circumstances at issue validate the search and the use of evidence found therein. The
exceptions are fact-specific and oftentimes complex, but generally arise in the following
circumstances: (i) when there are exigent circumstances, (ii) an item is in plain view, (iii)
the search involves a mobile automobile, (iv) the search is incident to the subject’s arrest,
(v) the subject consented to the search, (vi) the search is within a ‘sensitive area’ (such as
an airport or border), or (vii) the search is cursory and only requires reasonable suspicion.
See State v. Hendrickson, 129 Wn.2d 61, 71, 917 P.2d 563, 572 (Wash. 1996) (citing
Robert F. Utter, Survey of Washington Search and Seizure Law: 1988 Update, 73 U.
PUGET SOUND L. REV. 411, 528-80 (1988)).
38
Slobogin, supra note 4 at 449.
39
Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 56 (1967).
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privacy that is broad in scope. As was said in Osborn v.
United States40, the ‘indiscriminate use of such devices in
law enforcement raises grave constitutional questions under
the Fourth and Fifth Amendments,’ and imposes ‘heavier
responsibility on this Court in its supervision of the fairness
of procedures.’41
The Court went on to discuss how a lack of such particularity, in effect,
bypasses the purpose and rationale of the probable cause requirement:
The Fourth Amendment’s requirement that a warrant
‘particularly describ[e] the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized,’ repudiate[s] general warrants
and ‘makes general searches…impossible and prevents the
seizure of one thing under a warrant describing another. As
to what is to be taken, nothing is left to the discretion of the
officer executing the warrant.42
Insofar as these obstacles are in place and a warrant is properly executed, a
higher probability of the integrity of the search is maintained.43
[19] If the video surveillance is conducted either pursuant to a properly
executed warrant or without a warrant but properly justified by one of the
recognized exceptions, video surveillance is permitted and admissible
against the surveillee.
Courts analyzing investigations utilizing
surreptitious video surveillance have generally rejected claims that its
inherent intrusiveness makes it per se unconstitutional under the Fourth
Amendment.44
40

Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323, 329 n.7 (1966).
Berger, 388 U.S. at 56.
42
Id. at 58-59.
43
It should also be noted that while the Berger Court recognized this necessity in the
general context of eavesdropping, it follows that such particularity is even more vital
when dealing with hyper-intrusive eavesdropping techniques such as covert video
surveillance.
44
See e.g. United States v. Taketa, 923 F.2d 665 (9th Cir. 1991); United States v.
Andonian, 735 F. Supp. 1469, 1478 (C.D. Cal 1990); United States v. Gonzalez, 328 F.3d
543 (9th Cir. 2003); United States v. Shryock, 342 F.3d 948, 978 (9th Cir. 2003); United
States v. Torres, 751 F.2d 875 (7th Cir. 1984).
41
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APPLICATION OF TITLE III TO VIDEO SURVEILLANCE

[20] When enacted in 1968, the drafters of Title III of the Omnibus Crime
Control and Safe Streets Act of 196845 purported to create a more efficient
regulatory framework for controlling wiretaps, bugging devices, and other
similar aural surveillance methods. They aimed to create strict and narrow
prerequisites that were difficult to meet, in an effort to justify the increased
level of intrusion upon an individual’s personal privacy.46 While Title III
does not expressly address video surveillance, courts occasionally apply its
designation of “electronic communications”47 in cases involving video
surveillance investigations.48
[21] First and foremost, Title III imposes a probable cause requirement,
analogous to that found under the prescriptions of the Fourth
Amendment.49 Without demonstrating probable cause to support the
investigator’s belief that the subject of the impending investigation “has
committed, is committing, or is about to commit a particular offense”50 and
that surveying such communications will provide evidence of this
commission,51 the agent seeking judicial authorization under Title III
should be unsuccessful.
[22] In addition to this preliminary showing, Title III’s procedural
regulations mandate that each application for a wiretap include facts
sufficient for the reviewing judge to conclude, “normal investigative
45

Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (2001)).
46
Id.
(d) To safeguard the privacy of innocent persons, the interception of
wire or oral communications where none of the parties to the
communication has consented to the interception should be allowed only
when authorized by a court of competent jurisdiction and should remain
under the control and supervision of the authorizing court. Interception
of wire and oral communications should further be limited to certain
major types of offenses and specific categories of crime with assurances
that the interception is justified and that the information obtained
thereby will not be misused.
47
18 U.S.C. § 2510 (2001).
48
Id.
49
18 U.S.C. § 2511 (2001).
50
18 U.S.C. § 2518(3)(a) (2001).
51
18 U.S.C. § 2518(3)(b).
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procedures have been tried and have failed or reasonably appear to be
unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too dangerous.”52 This prong can be
met via a convincing argument from the investigating officer that other
methods would be unavailing. Rationale for the existence of this particular
requirement is based on the desire to strictly limit the use of wiretaps and
ensure that it is not resorted to in situations where “traditional investigative
measures”53 would suffice to expose the crime.54 Absent specific
circumstances that render normal investigative techniques particularly
ineffective, the application must be denied.55
[23] The next statutory constraint requiring a high degree of specificity for
the purported allegations is akin to the particularity requirement of the
Fourth Amendment.56 In the same vein as warrant requirement logic, Title
III requires a showing of particularity of the places to be searched and
items to be seized in the application’s endorsement of necessity.57
[24] In an effort to prevent abuses of this potentially harmful privilege,
Section 2518(5) of Title III additionally requires a degree of minimization
during the period of interception.58 Without this constraint, the law
enforcement officials conducting the interception would have almost
limitless access to their subjects’ private conversations. As a result, these
investigators may improperly be exposed to incriminating evidence that
they were not otherwise privy to. By further adding a thirty-day limitation
on the period of judicially authorized interception, the drafters of Title III
recognized its high potential for abuse.59

52

S. REP. NO. 1097, at 101 (1968) ("Normal investigative procedure would include, for
example, standard visual or aural surveillance techniques by law enforcement officers,
general questioning or interrogation under an immunity grant, use of regular search
warrants, and the infiltration of conspiratorial groups by undercover agents or
informants...").
53
United States v. Commito, 918 F.2d 95, 98 (9th Cir. 1990).
54
See e.g. United States v. Kahn, 415 U.S. 143, 152 (1974); United States v. Brown, 761
F.2d 1272 (9th Cir. 1985); Commito, 918 F.2d at 98; United States v. Smith, 893 F.2d
1573, 1582 (9th Cir. 1990).
55
See United States v. Ippolito, 774 F.2d 1482, 1486 (9th Cir. 1985).
56
18 U.S.C. § 2518(4) (2001).
57
Id.
58
18 U.S.C. § 2518(5) (2001).
59
Id.
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[25] The remedy for a violation of the wiretap’s procedural regulations is
suppression. Section 2518(10)(a) of the federal wiretap statute provides in
pertinent part, “Any aggrieved person in any trial . . . before any court . . .
may move to suppress the contents of any wire or oral communication
intercepted . . . or evidence derived therefrom, on the grounds that . . . the
order of authorization or approval under which it was intercepted is
insufficient on its face.”60 Essentially, if the affidavit fails to satisfy the
necessity requirement or is procedurally defective in some way, the
reviewing court is expected to suppress the communications at issue in
order to safeguard the privacy interests of the parties to the interception.
[26] In 1968, when Title III61 was passed, video technology had just begun
to emerge as an investigative tool.62 As such, there was little chance that
such a budding development would have specific reference in the statute.
Despite the fact that the technology for video surveillance—and even
surreptitious video surveillance—has been widely available to the general
public for quite some time,63 both the courts and our legislative bodies have
failed to affirmatively regulate this area. Peculiarly, a great deal of
particularized attention has been placed upon the regulation of aural
surveillance and other types of electronic communications, while visual
surveillance has been all but ignored. As the rationale for implementing
these regulations on aural and electronic surveillance is based mainly upon
the need to normalize investigative methods that are so frequently utilized,
it is unclear why visual surveillance (which is also used quite frequently)
has not been similarly regulated.
[27] Future amendments to Title III fail to shed any light on the intended
regulation of video surveillance or recordings.
The Electronic
Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (“ECPA”)64 amended Title III to
60

18 U.S.C. § 2518(10)(a)(ii) (2001).
18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (2001).
62
See generally Robert C. Owen and Melissa Mather, The Decisionmaking Process:
Thawing Out the “Cold Record”: Some Thoughts on How Videotaped Records May
Affect Traditional Standards of Deference on Direct and Collateral Review, 2 J. APP.
PRAC. & PROCESS 411 (2000).
63
Miniaturized cameras for “discreet / unobtrusive surveillance” are inexpensive and
publicly available for commercial use. See
http://www.wecusurveillance.com/page/435746.
64
18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522. Congress renamed Title III as the “Electronic
Communications Privacy Act of 1986,” which is the amendment of the 1968 statute.
61
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include the interception of electronic communications. In fact, Congress
explicitly stated that the ECPA was not meant to include video
surveillance. In the Senate Judiciary Committee Report accompanying the
ECPA, the Committee reaffirmed the statutory definition of ‘aural
acquisition’ and went on to clarify that “[o]ther forms of surveillance are
not within the proposed legislation.”65 Judge Kozinski of the Ninth Circuit
visited the issue of the omission of video surveillance from the
amendments to Title III and posited,
Does it really follow that, had Congress considered the
matter directly, it would have treated video surveillance
exactly the same as those methods it did consider? I find it
more plausible to infer that by choosing to exclude video
surveillance . . . Congress and the President were
recognizing that it is different from wiretapping and should
not be treated as the same.66
[28] In the interim, however, law enforcement officials are making use of
these new technologies without express regulations to follow. Ultimately,
the judiciary is left to regulate these matters, as defendants move to
suppress the resulting evidence.67
3. HYBRID APPROACH TO VIDEO SURVEILLANCE RECORDINGS
[29] As there is no statute applicable to domestic recordings produced via
surreptitious video surveillance, courts facing this issue have been
developing creative ways to adjudicate it. Most notably, various courts
have bifurcated the evidence itself, separating the evidence into the audioonly component and the silent video component, before determining its
65

S. REP. NO. 1097, at 90 (1968); see also United States v. Torres, 751 F.2d 875, 886 (7th
Cir. 1984); Simmons, supra note 10, at 733, n46.
66
United States v. Koyomejian, 970 F.2d 536, 551 (9th Cir. 1992).
67
Id. at 551
By rushing to develop a code that will comprehensively deal with video
warrants on its first outing in the field, my colleagues have overreached.
Attempting the task normally reserved to the political branches, they
have abdicated the adjudicatory function while undertaking the task of
legislation badly. The result is that they have shackled the government
with more restrictions than the Constitution imposes, while at the same
time giving citizens less protection than the Constitution affords them.
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admissibility.68 The reviewing courts will then apply Title III to the audioonly component, while leaving the admissibility of the silent video
component contingent on satisfaction of the Fourth Amendment
requirements.69
[30] Despite the logic of this analytical approach, the inconsistency
promulgated by these alternative methods of interpretation is becoming
problematic. Without a generally applicable framework, subjects of video
surveillance are held only to the judicial standards found in their
jurisdiction while individual privacy protections and the admissibility of
such evidence can differ from circuit to circuit.
C. JURISDICTIONAL SURVEY OF CASE LAW DEALING WITH VIDEO
SURVEILLANCE
[31] Despite judicial recognition that this video surveillance does carry
tendencies of heightened intrusiveness, the courts have generally found this
level of intrusion to remain permissible under certain jurisdictionally
specific guidelines. Yet, we are left with inconsistency, regardless of
which approach a lower court chooses to apply.
1. SUPREME COURT
[32] The Supreme Court’s analysis of electronic surveillance in several
cases has provided us with a barebones regulatory scheme that many lower
courts have applied to more specific methods of investigation.70 Despite
the statutory omission, many lower courts have made attempts to force the
video surveillance square peg into the general electronic surveillance round
hole.71
68

See e.g. United States v. Shryock, 342 F.3d 948, 978 (9th Cir. 2003); see also, United
States v. Honken, 378 F. Supp.2d 880 (8th Cir. 2004); United States v. Gonzalez, Inc., 412
F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2005); United States v. Fernandez, 388 F.3d 1199 (9th Cir. 2004);
United States v. Smith, 413 F.3d 1253 (10th Cir. 2005).
69
Shryock, 342 F.3d at 978. Audio portions of the recording fall under the ambit of Title
III and will be admitted or suppressed based on that analysis. Then a separate analysis
based on Fourth Amendment principles governs the silent visual recordings captured.
70
See Mulligan, supra, note 14 at 315-17.
71
See Kanya A. Bennett, Comment, Can Facial Recognition Technology be used to Fight
the New War Against Terrorism?: Examining the Constitutionality of Facial Recognition
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[33] In the 1967 case of Berger v. New York,72 the Supreme Court
recognized that certain methods of investigation produce greater invasions
on individual privacy and autonomy than the classic physical search. The
subject of Berger was the regulation of government-initiated “electronic
eavesdropping”73 in a New York statute. The state statute required the
government investigator to present, under oath, a statement that provides:
[T]hat there is reasonable ground to believe that evidence of
a crime may be thus obtained, and particularly describing
the person or persons whose communications, conversations
or discussions are to be overheard or recorded and the
purpose thereof . . . [and] in connection with the issuance of
such an order the justice or judge … shall satisfy himself of
the existence of reasonable grounds for the granting of such
an application.74
The Court held that this statute was in violation of the Fourth Amendment,
as it did not meet the threshold prescriptions of the warrant requirement.75
“In short, the [New York] statute’s blanket grant of permission to
eavesdrop [was] without adequate judicial supervision or protective
procedures.”76
[34] The Berger Court avoided the task of creating particularized
guidelines and parameters that were applicable for a more in-depth Fourth
Surveillance Systems, 3 N.C. J. L. & TECH. 151, 169 (2001); see generally Mulligan, supra
note 10.
72
Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
73
Id. at 49.
74
Id. at 44.
75
See Simmons, supra note 10, at 552 (2003)
The Court held that orders issued under the statute would not conform to
the particularity requirement, since the order need only describe ‘the
person or persons whose communications . . . are to be overheard.’ . . .
The Court [also] held that allowing the monitoring to continue for two
months ‘is the equivalent of a series of intrusions, searches, and seizures
pursuant to a single showing of probable cause.’ . . . [And further, that]
the Court was trouble by the fact that there was no mandatory
termination of the order ... [or that there be a showing of] exigent
circumstances in order to justify the lack of notice.
76
Berger, 388 U.S. at 59.
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Amendment analysis of electronic surveillance or its counterparts.77 In
recognizing this regulatory lag, the Court found, “[t]he law, though jealous
of individual privacy, has not kept pace with these advances in scientific
knowledge.”78 Similarly, in Lopez v. United States, the Court again
recognized that “the fantastic advances in the field of electronic
communication constitute a great danger to the privacy of the individual
. . . . [I]ndiscriminate use of such devices in law enforcement raises grave
constitutional questions under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments.”79 By
failing to keep up with these types of advances, investigative methods
utilizing these tools may continue to be carried out with little regulatory
guidance.80 Despite the Court’s recognition that the law has not been able
to keep up with technology, no default standard has been set.81 Instead,
issues involving video surveillance have been dealt with on a case-by-case
basis on the federal appellate level, which has led to a jurisdictional rift in
interpretation.
2. CLEAR SPLIT IN THE CIRCUIT COURTS
[35] In 1984, the Seventh Circuit became the first federal appellate court to
consider and subsequently rule on surreptitious video surveillance as an
investigative tool.82 In United States v. Torres,83 the Seventh Circuit
77

Id.
Id. at 49.
79
Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 441 (1963).
80
Berger, 388 U.S. at 56 (Stewart, J., concurring). Justice Stewart’s opinion in Berger
underscores the need for heightened restrictions when dealing with an intrusive method of
investigation, which in this case was trespassory eavesdropping through bugging devices.
Justice Steward stated,
The need for particularity and evidence of reliability in the showing
required when judicial authorization is sought for the kind of electronic
eavesdropping involved in this case is especially great. The standard of
reasonableness embodied in the Fourth Amendment demands that the
showing of justification match the degree of intrusion.
This analysis applies with equal force to covert video surveillance, though it was not at
issue in Berger, as video surveillance has been characterized as more intrusive than the
type of eavesdropping at issue here.
81
Id. at 118 (White, J., dissenting). Justice White’s opinion addresses the issue of whether
“this case [is] a proper vehicle for resolving all of these broad constitutional and
legislative issues raised by the problem of official use of wiretapping and eavesdropping.”
Id.
82
Simmons, supra note 10, at 556-59.
78
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emphasized the fact that no existing statute explicitly dealt with covert
video surveillance, including both Title III and the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act.84
However, the court used Rule 41 of
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure85 to provide judicial authorization
to grant warrants for such surveillance.86 At first glance, this placed
analysis of covert video surveillance under the ambit of general Fourth
Amendment principles. Yet, the approach taken actually synthesized
Fourth Amendment principles with some of the more narrow constraints
applicable to other forms of electronic surveillance found in Title III.87
Because Title III does not include video surveillance techniques but does
address surreptitious aural interception, it was used as a guide in
formulating the requirements for surreptitious visual interception. By
interweaving these doctrines, the Torres court was able to impose more
strict rules upon the use of video surveillance—a technique it found to be
increasingly intrusive and in need of such additional constraints.88
[36] Following the Torres ruling, six other federal circuits joined the
Seventh Circuit’s reasoning and application of the standard used in Torres
as the benchmark from which to begin interpretations of the
83

United States v. Torres, 751 F.2d 875 (7th Cir. 1984) (reinforcing the notion that this
particular issue had not yet been addressed).
84
Id. at 877-82.
85
FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(c) provides in pertinent part, Property or persons which may be
seized with a warrant. A warrant may be issued under this rule to search for and seize any
(1) property that constitutes evidence of the commission of a criminal
offense; or (2) contraband, the fruits of crime, or things otherwise
criminally possessed; or (3) property designed or intended for use or
which is or has been used as the means of committing a criminal
offense; or (4) person for whose arrest there is probable cause, or who is
unlawfully restrained.
86
See United States v. Koyomejian, 970 F.2d 536, 542 (9th Cir. 1992) (stating that Rule
41(b) permits a district court to issue warrants for silent video surveillance); see also,
United States v. Mesa-Rincon, 911 F.2d 1433, 1436 (10th Cir. 1990) (“Rule 41 is
sufficiently flexible to include within its scope electronic intrusions authorized upon a
finding of probable cause.”) (quoting United States v. New York Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159,
169 (1977)).
87
18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (2001).
88
Simmons, supra note 10, at 558 (“[A] warrant for video surveillance should require a
higher showing by the government than a warrant for a traditional search, and since video
surveillance is ‘identical in its indiscriminate character to wiretapping and bugging,’ the
rules which apply to wiretapping and bugging should also apply to video surveillance.”).
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constitutionality of surreptitious video surveillance. 89 The general
standard implemented by these seven circuits, with slight departures,
requires that a warrant based on probable cause must be properly issued by
a neutral and detached judicial officer before such surveillance can
proceed, just as required by the Fourth Amendment. By then looking to
Title III’s narrow requirements, these courts further require that for any
investigation
(1) the judge issuing the warrant must find that ‘normal
investigative procedures have been tried and have failed or
reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be
too dangerous . . . (2) the warrant must contain ‘a particular
description of the type of communication sought to be
intercepted, and a statement of the particular offense to
which it relates,’ . . . (3) the warrant must not allow the
period of interception to be ‘longer than is necessary to
achieve the objective of the authorization . . . or in any event
longer than thirty days,’ (though extensions are possible) . . .
and (4) the warrant must require that the interception ‘be
conducted in such a way as to minimize the interception of
communications not otherwise subject to interception.’90
[37] While the remaining five circuits have adhered to the Torres court’s
characterization of video surveillance as an investigative technique that
carries the potential for increased intrusiveness, they have not applied the
Seventh Circuit’s approach in their analyses. This divergence in judicial
treatment has created a rift in the propriety of this investigative technique,
leaving open the possibility for inconsistent evidentiary rulings from one
jurisdiction to the next, irregularity in practices by police agencies, and
confusion in understanding Fourth Amendment rights by defendants.

89

The six circuits that have followed the Torres court’s analysis include: Second Circuit in
United States v. Biasucci, 786 F.2d 504 (2nd Cir. 1986); Third Circuit in United States v.
Williams, 124 F.3d 411 (3rd Cir. 1997); Fifth Circuit in United States v. Cuevas-Sanchez,
821 F.2d 248 (5th Cir. 1987); Eighth Circuit in United States v. Falls, 34 F.3d 674 (8th
Cir. 1994); Ninth Circuit in United States v, Nerber, 222 F.3d 597, 603 (9th Cir. 2000);
and Tenth Circuit in United States v. Mesa-Rincon, 911 F.2d 1433, 1442 (10th Cir. 1990).
90
Koyomejian, 970 F.2d at 542.
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BYPASSING ANY JUDICIAL SCRUTINY: USE OF SNITCHES

[38] The confluence of the laws governing video surveillance and the use
of undercover informants creates a doctrinal problem. Undercover
informants - or snitches - are widely used today as a valuable and efficient
investigative tool by police agencies.91 The use of a consenting snitch in
obtaining non-video surveillance has been recognized by the courts as
unproblematic with regards to the Fourth Amendment.92 Taking the
analysis one step further, however, use of a consenting snitch to obtain
surreptitious video surveillance effectively creates a regulatory loophole by
allowing the investigating officers to bypass all procedural requirements
upon obtaining the snitch’s consent. By obtaining the consent of a snitch,
the government is relieved of the procedural obligations as required by
both the Fourth Amendment and Title III. It is in this scenario that the
intrusiveness of video surveillance is essentially disregarded, since the
protective mechanisms such as the warrant requirement and review
processes no longer need to be satisfied.
A. CURRENT LAW GOVERNING THE USE OF SNITCHES IN UNDERCOVER
INVESTIGATIONS
[39] The use of informants by law enforcement has become a widely
utilized investigative mechanism. The basic “snitch” structure usually
involves participating informants, who are commonly criminals
themselves, agreeing to work alongside law enforcement officials in
exchange for lenience or exculpation for past or present offenses.93
[40] Various scholars have commented on the legal and societal
consequences that arise from this type of quid pro quo arrangement.94
Common concerns include, but are not limited to: unjustified invasions of
privacy, heightened intrusions on individual autonomy, entrapment,
decreased social control, negative public perception of law enforcement
91

See Susan S. Kuo, Official Indiscretions: Considering Sex Bargains with Government
Informants, 38 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1643, 1649-50 (2005).
92
See e.g., Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 301-302 (1966).
93
See Alexandra Natapoff, Snitching: The Institutional and Communal Consequences, 73
U. CIN. L. REV. 645, 651-52 (2004).
94
See generally id.; see also MARX, supra note 12.
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and the justice system, and instances of internal corruption.95 These
concerns have proliferated as the prevalence of undercover snitch
investigations has rapidly increased.
[41] Judicial and legislative characterization of informant-aided
investigations has lent support for this hybrid form of plea-bargaining
benefiting the snitch, while bolstering arguments in favor of maintaining
this practice in its current form.96 Notwithstanding the greater ease and
reliability associated with garnering evidence through snitch investigations,
the practice of utilizing informants is left largely unregulated.97
[42] A line of cases decided by the United States Supreme Court and Title
III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 196898 illustrate
favorable judicial and legislative treatment provided to snitch
investigations. The current trend leans toward placing greater discretion at
the hands of law enforcement, and less weight on the importance of the
after-the-fact review process. The complacency by the courts with regards
to use of snitches has led to confidence by law enforcement agencies in
using confidential informants as a vehicle to carry out surreptitious video
surveillance.
B. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF THE USE OF SNITCHES
[43] The United States Supreme Court visited the topic of snitch
investigations, in isolation, in a series of cases involving informants who,
while acting in concert with the government, consented to surveillance of
conversations that ultimately implicated their cohorts. The common thread
in these decisions lies in the Court’s finding that there is no reasonable
expectation of privacy in conversations between criminal cohorts or coconspirators regarding past, present, or future activities that are criminal in

95

See MARX, supra note 12, at 33.
Id. at 45-54 (“Recent judicial and legislative changes have encouraged the spread of
undercover tactics in two general ways: indirectly, by creating new restrictions on
conventional forms of police investigative behavior; and directly, by broadening their
legal foundation.” Id. at 46).
97
Natapoff, supra note 93 at 669 (citing James Vorenberg, Decent Restraint of
Prosecutorial Power, 94 HARV. L. REV.1521, 1566 (1981)).
98
18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (2001).
96
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nature.99 To add to this finding, the Court has also found that using
technological tools (such as those used for electronic surveillance) adds no
additional intrusion and no further violation of this privacy expectation.100
[44] In On Lee v. United States,101 the Court validated the single-party
consent rule, essentially finding that when one party to a conversation
consents to the electronic surveillance of that conversation, there is no need
to demonstrate probable cause or even to obtain a warrant, since those
circumstances fail to implicate the Fourth Amendment or its
requirements.102 In On Lee, the government placed a microphone on its
snitch, Chin Poy, which transmitted the contents of On Lee’s incriminating
statements to the agents located outside. The Court’s analysis hinged on
the fact that no physical trespass103 had occurred since Chin Poy was
considered an invited guest and found no violation of the surveillee’s
reasonable expectation of privacy.
[45] Similarly, in United States v. White, a tape-recorder placed on the
person of an informant provided the Government with audiotapes
containing incriminating statements made by the defendant which were
admitted into evidence in lieu of the informant’s testimony.104 The Court
re-characterized On Lee’s single-party consent rule by focusing more
heavily on the surveillee than on the snitch. The Court ultimately
formulated its analysis on the theory of assumption of the risk rather than
the affirmative consent of a cooperating snitch.105 As one commentator
99

See e.g., Hofffa, 385 U.S. at 301-303.
See Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427 (1963).
101
On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747 (1952).
102
See Captain Timothy A. Raezer, Needed Weapons in the Army’s War on Drugs:
Electronic Surveillance and Informants, 116 MIL. L. REV. 1, at 6 (1987).
103
Cf. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
104
United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 747 (1971).
105
White, 401 U.S. at 751-52; see, Raezer, supra, note 102, at 15
This theory [stated in White] was based upon the premise that the
defendant did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy that the
person with whom he spoke would keep the conversation secret.
Because a party to a conversation can reveal it without violating the
defendant’s expectation of privacy, the consenting party’s recording or
transmitting of that conversation, likewise, does not violate the
defendant’s reasonable expectation of privacy. In short, a person
assumes the risk that the other party to a conversation will reveal,
transmit, or record it.
100
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said, the Court found that, by talking to another person, the defendant
surveillee had assumed the risk that his conversation would be repeated or
was being recorded and consequently had no reasonable expectation of
privacy in its contents.106
[46] The implications of On Lee’s ruling on more intrusive investigative
techniques, such as covert video surveillance with snitches, are important
to consider:
Abolition of On Lee would not end electronic
eavesdropping. It would prevent public officials from
engaging in that practice unless they first had probable
cause to suspect an individual of involvement in illegal
activities and had tested their version of the facts before a
detached judicial officer. The interest On Lee fails to
protect is the expectation of the ordinary citizen, who has
never engaged in illegal conduct in his life, that he may
carry on his private discourse freely, openly, and
spontaneously without measuring his every word against the
connotations it might carry when instantaneously heard by
others unknown to him and unfamiliar with his situation or
analyzed in a cold, formal record played days, months, or
years after the conversation. Interposition of a warrant
requirement is designed not to shield ‘wrongdoers,’ but to
secure a measure of privacy and a sense of personal security
throughout our society.107
[47] While the general tenets of the assumption of the risk doctrine are
meant to remove any benefit of the doubt criminal wrongdoers would
retain in their illegal activities, the scope of this doctrine reaches much
further. The majority of the Court has not visited this quandary, but Justice

106

Cf., Tom P. Conom, Privacy and the Fourth Amendment in the Twenty-First Century,
19 CHAMPION 13 (1995) The author criticizes the Court’s decision in White by stating,
“The Supreme Court adopted the false and pernicious assumption of the risk doctrine in
which a citizen is said to forfeit all constitutional protections against electronic
surveillance by the mere act of communicating with a fellow citizen.” Id. at 13-14.
107
White, 401 U.S. at 789-90.
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Harlan visited the problem this carve-out creates in his dissenting opinion
in White.108
The critical question, therefore, is whether under our system
of government, as reflected in the Constitution, we should
impose on our citizens the risks of the electronic listener or
observer without at least the protection of a warrant
requirement. This question must, in my view, be answered
by assessing the nature of a particular practice and the likely
extent of its impact on the individual’s sense of security
balanced against the utility of the conduct as a technique of
law enforcement. For those more extensive intrusions that
significantly jeopardize the sense of security which is the
paramount concern of Fourth Amendment liberties, I am of
the view that more self-restraint by law enforcement
officials is required and at the least warrants should be
necessary.109
Despite this recognition, however, both Congress and the Supreme Court
have left a hole in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. By failing to
recognize Fourth Amendment limitations when only one party to the
conversation being surveilled has consented, the Court has created a path
by which law enforcement officials can avoid the warrant requirement and
its prerequisites.

108

In Lopez, the Court ruled that the use of technological tools to heighten the reliability
of evidence does not implicitly generate any greater intrusion than that which may be
heard by the human ear, or recanted by the informant’s memory. Lopez, 373 U.S. at 438.
However, Justice Harlan made a point in White to clarify that this characterization, as
found in both Harlan and Lopez, is not necessarily applicable to surreptitious video
surveillance carried out in conjunction with informant consent. In his dissenting opinion
he noted that “in Hoffa, Mr. Justice Stewart took care to mention that ‘surreptitious’
monitoring was not there before the Court, and so too in Lopez.” White, 401 U.S. at 758.
Justice Harlan went on to further clarify that “the issue of the informer’s consent to
utilization of this technique is not properly before [the Court].” Id. at 771. See also Hoffa
v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966).
109
White, 401 U.S. at 786-87 (Harlan, J. dissenting).
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C. LEGISLATIVE INTERPRETATION OF THE USE OF SNITCHES
[48] Title III provides clear guidelines that make it lawful for a person “to
intercept a wire, oral, or electronic communication,110 where such person is
a party to the communication or one of the parties to the communication
has given prior consent to such interception.”111 Essentially, Title III
allows law enforcement to circumvent the warrant requirement, or any
comparable prerequisite, if it utilizes a snitch in its investigation.112 As
long as a participating informant is a party to the conversation surveilled or
recorded, the officers carrying out that investigation need not jump the
numerous administrative hoops otherwise required.113
[49] In line with the Supreme Court’s characterization, Title III’s
deregulation of snitch investigations is largely based on the doctrines of
implied consent and assumption of the risk.114 Assessing the convergence
of Title III with the use of a snitch, Justice Harlan in his dissenting opinion
in United States v. White found cause for concern:
[T]he comprehensive provisions of Title III are evidence of
the extent of congressional concern with the impact of
electronic surveillance on the right to privacy. This concern
is further manifested in the introductory section of the
Senate Committee Report. Although §2511(2)(c) exempts
110

Title III was amended in 1986 by the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA),
which prompted the inclusion of “electronic communications” to wire and oral
communications. 18 U.S.C. § 2701 (2000); see also S. REP. 99-541 (1986).
111
18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(c) (2001).
112
See, MARX, supra note 10, at 55 (“Most of the electronic surveillance associated with
covert means is not subject to a warrant restriction because it occurs either in public or in
situations where one of the parties consents… The single-party consent laws found in
most states permit this.”).
113
See, Pub. L No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197 (West 1968). The rationale for this relaxation of
the Constitutional requirements can be gleaned from the legislative comments
accompanying the statute.
114
See, Slobogin, supra note 32, at 20-24. Despite an absence of exigent circumstances,
some courts have sanctioned certain searches and seizures that have been conducted
without a warrant. Rationales for permitting such warrantless action are based on the
doctrines of implied consent and assumption of the risk. Namely, that an individual who
engages in criminal conduct assumes the risk that their cohort is acting in concert with the
Government, for the purpose of implicating that individual. This rationale goes hand-inhand with the Supreme Court’s adjudication of this issue.
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consensual and participant monitoring by law enforcement
agents from the general prohibitions against surveillance
without prior judicial authorization and makes the fruits
admissible in court, see §2515, congressional malaise with
such conduct is evidence by the contrastingly limited
endorsement of consensual surveillance carried out by
private individuals.115
[50] Nonetheless, the use of a snitch was recognized by the majority as a
means to bypass the requirements of Title III.116 As Harlan articulates,
“All these values are sacrificed by a rule of law that permits official
monitoring of private discourse limited only by the need to locate a willing
assistant.”117 This sentiment is further aggravated by use of more intrusive
means of surveillance such as video surveillance.
III. EXPLOITING THE REGULATORY LOOPHOLE: USING THE SNITCH TO
OBTAIN SURREPTITIOUS VIDEO SURVEILLANCE
[51] The Supreme Court has not yet definitively ruled on the convergence
of snitch consent and its impact on the regulation of covert video
surveillance.118 Current jurisprudence in this area is largely governed by
the respective approaches taken by the lower circuit courts facing this
dilemma. However, little or no consideration has been given by legislators
or scholars as to the consequences of importing the single party consent
doctrine or the assumption of the risk justification for the propriety of
snitch-obtained evidence into the context of more intrusive video

115

White, 401 U.S. at 791 (italics in original) (citing 82 Stat. 212, 18 U.S.C. §2510, S.
REP. NO. 1097, at 69 (1968)).
116
See generally White, 401 U.S. at 745.
117
Id. at 788-89.
118
See Conom, supra, note 106, at 20, n. 27
The critical question is, does the Fourth Amendment apply to video surveillance
so that video invasion of privacy may only be accomplished by prior judicial
review and issuance of a limiting warrant? The federal courts of appeals which
have to date considered this issue are unanimous that the Fourth Amendment
does apply to video surveillance. However, the Supreme Court has not yet
spoken.
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surveillance gathering (as assessed by the courts to be issues of Title III
and Fourth Amendment jurisprudence).119
[52] The most obvious ramification of this confluence of these distinct
issues is its effect on the warrant requirement. Although Title III
anticipates the use of snitches as a means of bypassing the default warrant
requirement,120 the statute fails to sanction video surveillance. Only
through judicial application of Title III to investigations utilizing covert
video surveillance, falling outside the explicit confines of the statute, are
law enforcement officials provided the opportunity to bypass the warrant
requirement121 and maintain a heightened level of discretion in all aspects
of the investigation. All that is needed is a cooperating informant—a
snitch that consents to carrying out the surreptitious video surveillance. By
projecting the one-party consent exception found in Title III as well as the
assumption of the risk doctrine applied to more traditional methods of
wiretapping, snitches make it easier for investigating officers to conduct
their investigations without judicial or legislative scrutiny. Investigations
can proceed without many of the common procedural requirements
including but not limited to, prior judicial approval, 122 a foundational
showing of probable cause particularity and limitations in the scope of the
investigation, or ex post judicial review to ensure propriety of law
enforcement actions. By advancing Title III into subject matter not
contemplated by the legislature, the courts allow snitches to produce an
investigatory carte blanche unregulated by the legislatures and unresolved
by the courts.
[53] The application of assumption of the risk or single-party consent
jurisprudence onto the incidence of snitch aided video surveillance is
equally problematic. Directing this doctrine to a situation involving video
119

Although the courts, legislators, and scholars have commented on the intrusiveness of
video surveillance or on the use of snitches, generally, there has been no meaningful
assessment of the implications of the convergence of the two areas.
120
See Michael Goldsmith, Criminal Law: The Supreme Court and Title III: Rewriting the
Law of Electronic Surveillance (Part 1 of 2), 74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 3, n.1
(“Title III…does not cover so-called ‘consensual’ electronic surveillance in which one
party…consents to the eavesdropping. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2511(c)-(d)”).
121
By bypassing the warrant requirement, I am referring to both ex ante authorization
(including the showing of probable cause, particularity in the affidavit, and magisterial
approval), as well as ex post review to ensure that the search was carried out properly.
122
See, Slobogin supra note 32, at 107, n. 40.
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surveillance is similarly inappropriate, without adequately taking the
intrusiveness of this investigative method into consideration.
[54] With regards to both areas of jurisprudence, however, the regulatory
inconsistencies and trivialization of the warrant requirement are the
inevitable dangers of allowing this means of circumvention of the warrant
requirement to stand in its current form.
A. REGULATORY INCONSISTENCIES ARISE FROM CIRCUMVENTION OF THE
WARRANT REQUIREMENT
[55] By having neutral and detached judicial officers review and facilitate
the execution of a traditional warrant, the grant of power and discretion is
effectively bifurcated. Despite the fact that there are numerous other
political entities that could take charge of regulating the scope and breadth
of law enforcement activity, judicial officers act effectively in this role, as
they are often the most impartial and detached party.123 Since the law
enforcement officials involved in the matter are purported to have a
disproportionately greater interest in the outcome of the investigation,
placing the grant of authority in the hands of judicial officers works to
effectuate less bias within the judicial system by creating a system of
checks and balances.124
[56] The interests at stake underscore the danger in irregularity of
discretionary power. Because surreptitious video surveillance has the
potential to thwart individual liberties and personal privacy interests more
than other forms of traditional police searches and non-video surveillance,
this regulatory inconsistency has far-reaching implications that have not
even been considered. Professor Ric Simmons has commented on the
regulatory inconsistencies in these types of hyper-intrusive searches, noting
that, “The lack of a coherent constitutional framework for analyzing
hyper-intrusive searches is all the more startling and problematic in an era
when modern technologies and shifting political attitudes are generating
new opportunities for the government to conduct ever more intrusive
searches.”125 Furthermore, a blanket disposal of the warrant requirement
123
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absolves the courts of the opportunity to articulate a stance on the use of
more intrusive surveillance techniques by bootstrapping on the exceptions
afforded to the use of snitches.
B. RENDERING THE WARRANT REQUIREMENT MEANINGLESS
[57] The assumption of the risk doctrine works to disintegrate any
expectation of privacy a defendant may have, whether qualified by the
circumstances or not. The ease with which this expectation is disregarded
provides law enforcement with the opportunity to overstep their bounds,
whether in fact justified or not. The rationales for stripping a criminal
actor of his or her expectation of privacy when he or she is engaged in
illegal activity have been stated by the Supreme Court.126 However, the
legitimacy of any generalized presumption, such as the assumption of the
risk doctrine, must be questioned when it is indiscriminately extended to
particularized circumstances such as the use of new surveillance
technologies.
[58] If the assumption of the risk doctrine extinguishes any existing
expectation of privacy one might have when they are dealing with criminal
cohorts, shouldn’t one first be aware that such a risk is present if they are
held to have assumed it? “In order to assume a risk, one must first know
what the risk is.”127 Tom P. Conom visits the counterintuitive foundation
of the assumption of the risk doctrine, as set forth in White, by noting:
Unless the White plurality truly is willing to saddle
American society with the universal risk that every
conversation may be electronically monitored, then the
White plurality view is not only illogical and
unreasonable—it is absurd. Moreover, it defies common
sense as well as the common understanding of Americans
who yet have some sensitivity to the ‘qualitative difference’
between electronic surveillance and conventional police
investigation.128
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If a snitch is wired with a hidden video camera which captures
incriminating evidence beyond the scope of the snitch’s conversation with
the surveillee, it should be unreasonable to presume that the surveillee
assumed such a risk by merely conversing with a cooperating informant.
[59] Professor A. Westin has observed the societal consequences that may
develop as long as snitch consent continues to provide this regulatory
loophole in the context of the expanding area of hyper-intrusive searches:
Allowing eavesdropping with the consent of one party
would destroy the statutory plan of limiting the offenses for
which eavesdropping by device can be used and insisting on
a court-order process. And as technology enables every
man to carry his micro-miniaturized recorder everywhere he
goes and allows every room to be monitored surreptitiously
by built-in equipment, permitting eavesdropping with the
consent of one part would be to sanction a means of
reproducing conversation that could choke off much vital
social exchange.129
If this were the case, societal distrust and inter-social withdrawal would
permeate American culture, even among those not involved in illegal or
criminal activities. In addition to this “denigration of [the] individual is the
damage undercover police work causes to the democratic state’s objective
of remaining legitimate. First, because it relies on fraud and deceit, covert
investigation undermines trust in the government. More important, it
increases distrust in everyone, since anyone could be a government
agent.”130 Every individual would perpetually be walking on eggshells for
fear that any misstep—even in the presence of close friends or family—
could be used against them, regardless of any perceptual privacy interest
they may hold. This is not the type of societal interaction America should
be looking forward to.
[60] Cooperating snitches that consent to such monitoring are not held to
the same standard of accountability, but rather, are allowed to engage in
otherwise illegal conduct under the administrative shield against
129
130
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liability.131 Ultimately, these snitches have become the tools by which law
enforcement officials and investigators have been able to violate otherwise
viable privacy interests without repercussion or suppression. Supreme
Court decisions, which allow undercover police activity to proceed without
ex ante execution of a valid warrant trivializes individual rights and
interests by garbling the underlying basis for the assumption of the risk
doctrine.132 A snitch’s unilateral consent, in and of itself, should not be
deemed an automatic grant of blanket authorization to engage in any
method of investigation without regulation, guidelines, or parameters. Yet
the current state of jurisprudence in this area grants this very sort of
boundless sanction,133 thereby rendering the protections of the warrant
requirements ineffective and the process of obtaining a warrant
meaningless.
C. INEVITABLE ABUSES BY LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICIALS
[61] The confluence of the regulations governing both snitch consent and
video surveillance currently allow (and even endorse) law enforcement
officials to make an end-run around the very constitutional safeguards set
in place to limit the scope of their authority. Several cases decided by the
Supreme Court134 have accentuated the notion that law enforcement
discretion must be limited, as they are not suited to place limits on their
own authority.135
[62] In Johnson v. United States,136 the Supreme Court went great lengths
to underscore the importance of the warrant requirement in the preservation
of individual rights against the threat of excessive police discretion.
The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not
grasped by zealous officers, is not that it denies law
131
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enforcement the support of the usual inferences which
reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protection consists
in requiring that those inferences be drawn by a neutral and
detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer
engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out
crime. Any assumption that evidence sufficient to support a
magistrate’s disinterested determination to issue a search
warrant will justify the officers in making a search without a
warrant would reduce the Amendment to a nullity and leave
the people’s homes secure only in the discretion of police
officers…The right of officers to thrust themselves into a
home is also a grave concern, not only to the individual but
to a society which chooses to dwell in reasonable security
and freedom from surveillance. When the right of privacy
must reasonably yield to the right of a search is, as a rule, to
be decided by a judicial officer, not by a policeman or a
government enforcement agent.137
Snitch consent, by eliminating the need for a warrant, has denigrated this
principle of power-shifting and has worked to promote the very situation
the Supreme Court in Johnson so vehemently condemned.
[63] The Court in Beck v. Ohio also criticized these law enforcement
principles when it noted that the investigators’ failure to obtain a warrant in
Katz substituted “the far less reliable procedure of an after-the-event
justification for the . . . search, too likely to be subtly influenced by the
familiar shortcomings of hindsight judgment.”138
[64] Placing this almost immeasurable amount of discretion in the hands of
law enforcement officials provides them the opportunity to engage in
surveillance (searches and seizures) in an indiscriminate manner with the
opportunity to fill in the gaps of minimization, necessity, and particularity
after-the-fact. This discretion permits police officers to invade otherwise
protected rights with minimal fears of penalization by means of ex post
review, suppression, or reprimand.
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[65] The consequence of this regulatory loophole is the increase in the
potential for abuse. We already face an inherent dilemma in our current
method of dealing with exploitation of police discretion. The efficacy of
the exclusionary rule as a deterrent for the abuse of police authority has
consistently been questioned.139 Permitting blanket discretion on more
violative intrusions, by means of circumvention of the warrant requirement,
will further confound attempts at discouraging unlawful police action and
unjustified personal intrusions.140 Ignoring this gap in regulation has the
potential to allow, or even promote, reprehensible police conduct that may
go unpunished. Insofar as this heightened level of discretion is provided,
abuses of law enforcement authority may continue to run rampant, without
fear of regulatory intervention. As police power escalates, so may societal
distrust and antipathy.
IV. CONCLUSION
[66] In the current world of digital technology where innovations and
advancements are progressing by the millisecond, video cameras, video
surveillance, and visual recording equipment are now considered obsolete
technology. Without regulation of technology that has been widely used
by the general public for several decades, what can we expect of
regulations for up-and-coming advances in tools that can intrude on an
individual’s personal privacy?
[67] By continuing on a regulatory path lacking specifically tailored
legislation, particularly in dealing with the troublesome combination of
snitch cooperation and covert video surveillance, we are perpetuating a
problem that will only inflate at the rate of technological innovation.
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Advances in technology, such as facial recognition technology141 and
biometrics, will only provide law enforcement with future surveillance
equipment and unimaginable tools that invade the most intimate of
locations.142
[68] Even at this point, however, Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has not
ventured into the present circumstances, let alone future horizons, while
allowing regulatory loopholes to suppress judicial and legislative grappling
of the important issues. Without a strong resolve to establish a uniform
framework of the protections of the Fourth Amendment and a resolve to
refrain from expounding on old frameworks while overlooking important
advancements and distinctions, a slippery slope will render our Fourth
Amendment rights and protections a fiction.
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